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Abstract
Generalized trust is praised by many researchers as the foundation of functioning social systems. An
ongoing debate concerns the question whether and to what extent experiences impact individuals’
generalized trust, as measured with the standard trust survey question. So far, reliable empirical evi-
dence regarding the causal effect of experiences on generalized trust is scarce. Studies either do not
directly measure the quality of experiences or use designs that are prone to selection bias. In the pre-
sent study, we investigate a unique panel data set from Switzerland that contains measures of trust
and measures of negative experiences, i.e. victimization. We use change score analysis and ‘genetic
matching’ to investigate the causal effect of victimization on generalized trust and find no substantially
strong effect that is consistent across panel data waves.
Introduction
Do (negative) experiences influence generalized trust?
Generalized trust is defined as ‘the belief that “most people
can be trusted”’ (Uslaner, 2002: p. 21) and may be more
generally understood as a standard estimate of the trust-
worthiness of the average person one encounters
(Coleman, 1990: p. 104; Glanville and Paxton, 2007).
Besides praising generalized trust as an important ingredi-
ent for the functioning of societies, organizations, and pol-
itical and economic systems (Barber, 1983; Gambetta,
1990; Fukuyama, 1995; Kramer, 1999; Sztompka, 1999;
Nooteboom, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Herreros, 2004; Algan
and Cahuc, 2013), researchers debate to this day as to
what extent experiences impact generalized trust. A first
view is that generalized trust is a stable expectation, a pro-
pensity innate or learned in early life but not linked to
experience collected throughout one’s life (Giddens, 1991;
Wrightsman, 1992; Wilson, 1993; Becker, 1996; Jones,
1996; Uslaner, 2002, 2008). A second view holds that
experiences do very well matter for generalized trust
(Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 2002; Glanville and Paxton,
2007; Freitag and Traunmu¨ller, 2009; Glanville,
Andersson and Paxton, 2013). The empirical evidence re-
garding this question is mixed. A related debate concerns
the costs of crime and more specifically the effects of vic-
timization (Lejeune and Alex, 1973; Fischer, 1984; Brand,
Price and Britain, 2000; Entorf and Spengler, 2002;
Averdijk, 2010; Braakmann, 2011). It has long been
argued that crime hurts societies because experiences in the
form of victimization affect individuals’ generalized expect-
ations regarding others’ trustworthiness and, as a conse-
quence, individuals’ inclination to cooperate with others.
We contribute to these two debates in the following
way: first, while most trust research uses experience-based
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theoretical arguments (cp. Sturgis, Patulny and Allum,
2009; Glanville, Andersson and Paxton, 2013; Ingen and
Bekkers, 2015), few studies (for notable exceptions see
Section 2) directly measure the quality of the actual ex-
periences. Mostly studies assume that certain variables
such as formal membership or frequent social interactions
stand for positive experiences. By focusing on and meas-
uring negative experiences, we provide a direct investiga-
tion into the experience–generalized trust relationship. In
general, this gap in research is somewhat surprising, as it
is commonly claimed that trust is easily destroyed (Baier,
1986; Slovic, 1993). Second, while research on the direct
costs of crime is more straightforward (Brand, Price and
Britain, 2000; Cohen, 2004), the indirect costs have
received far less attention. Evidence on the effects of vic-
timization is largely based on interviews of nonrandomly
selected victims and not drawn from comparisons with
suitable control groups (cp. Lejeune and Alex, 1973;
Fischer, 1984; Averdijk, 2010). Our study adds to these
more qualitative studies and contributes to the existing
knowledge. Third, ours is the first study to focus on the
causal effect of negative experiences on trust. Instead of
relying on cross-sectional data (cp. Brehm and Rahn
1997; Salmi, Smolej and Kivivuori, 2007), we rely on sev-
eral panel waves and use change scores analysis in com-
bination with matching, which is a considerable step
forward compared with the earlier research. Our bench-
mark is an ideal thought experiment that we use to reveal
potential threats to the validity of our findings.
Below we start by presenting arguments and evidence
for two competing hypotheses. Then we elaborate fur-
ther on the design of the study. Subsequently, we outline
the data and the measures used. Then we present the em-
pirical results before discussing the findings and drawing
a conclusion.
Experiences and Generalized Trust:
Hypotheses and Evidence
In developing our hypotheses, we have to bear in mind
that we investigate the impact of negative experiences—
that one collects with specific persons–on generalized
trust, i.e. a standard estimate or a standard expectation
regarding others’ behaviour. The idea that individuals
adapt their expectations regarding specific others and
specific behaviours, such as a neighbour who misbe-
haves and does not return the borrowed lawnmower, is
relatively straightforward. In this case, trust in the
neighbour should change following the negative experi-
ence. However, the idea of adaptation of expectations is
less straightforward with regard to the concept of gener-
alized trust. Accordingly, a first scholarly position holds
that experiences do not or do hardly matter for general-
ized trust. In contrast, it is a stable psychological pro-
pensity (Wrightsman, 1992; Becker, 1996; Jones, 1996;
Couch and Jones, 1997; Uslaner, 1999, 2002). Uslaner
(2002) draws on Erikson (1968: p. 103) and suggests
that generalized trust is largely unaffected by experi-
ences with others such as friends and neighbours.
Rather, individuals will have high (or low) levels of gen-
eralized trust because of their early life experiences,
which are largely connected to their parents.1 Therefore,
generalized trust ‘is not experience-based trust’ (Uslaner,
2008: p. 291). Besides, as argued above, experiences—
negative or positive—are likely to affect our expect-
ations regarding the specific trustees with whom we col-
lect those experiences but less so our generalized
expectations: ‘Although some victims reported a general
mistrust of people as a consequence of victimization,
their mistrust is often focused on groups of people that
share demographic characteristics with the specific of-
fenders that committed violence against them, notably
immigrants and men’ (Averdijk, 2010: p. 128).
Empirical research lends some support to this first
position by showing that there is a strong correlation be-
tween generalized trust and optimism which, in turn,
seems to be a stable trait that is rooted in childhood so-
cialization (Uslaner, 2002) and that generalized trust is
rather stable throughout an individual’s lifetime
(Uslaner, 2002: pp. 162–165). Research investigating
the impact of positive experiences (through proxy vari-
ables such as voluntary engagement or membership)
partly finds no ‘causal’ relationship with generalized
trust. Ingen and Bekkers (2015) analyse five panel stud-
ies and find that the presumed positive causal effect of
engagement on trust is most probably due to selection.
Bekkers (2012) finds no effect of volunteering on trust
relying on a 4-year panel study. Finally, Sturgis, Patulny
and Allum (2009) find no causal effect of formal or in-
formal connections on trust, relying on the British
Household Panel Study. Another study that relies on a
panel of immigrants from Turkey, Pakistan, and former
Yugoslavia living in Denmark finds no effect of discrim-
ination experiences through teachers on generalized
trust (Dinesen, 2010). Above arguments and evidence
on the ‘irrelevance’ of experiences lead to a first research
hypothesis: Negative experiences do not have a negative
effect on generalized trust (H0).
Other scholars argue that experiences do very well
impact generalized trust (Rotter and Stein, 1971; Stack,
1978; Coleman, 1990; Offe, 1999; Hardin, 2002;
Burns, Kinder and Rahn, 2003; Yosano and Hayashi,
2005; Glanville and Paxton, 2007), assuming that indi-
viduals should generalize from experiences with specific
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others. Especially, with regard to negative experiences,
i.e. victimization, scholars have long argued that it
might undermine individuals’ sense of trust:
‘[V]ictimization [. . .] changes one’s perceptions of and
beliefs about others in society [. . .] by indicating others
as sources of threat or harm rather than sources of sup-
port’ (Macmillan, 2001: p. 12). There are common psy-
chological responses across victims and varying
victimization experiences. These come in the form of a
‘shattering of basic assumptions held about themselves
and their world’ (Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983: p. 1).
Even ‘minor’ victimizations such as burglary or robbery
may cause considerable suffering and lead to reactions
such as anxiety, fear, and depression (Janoff-Bulman
and Frieze, 1983: p. 2). The process of victimization can
then be seen as a ‘process that involves rebuilding
one’s assumptive world’ (Janoff-Bulman and Frieze,
1983: p. 1). Hence, generalized trusting expectations re-
garding others’ behaviour may change in this process
(Lejeune and Alex 1973; Fischer 1984; Bard and
Sangrey, 1986; Macmillan 2001; McCann, Sakheim and
Abrahamson 1988).
Empirical research also supports this second pos-
ition. Glanville and Paxton (2007) find that individuals
develop a generalized expectation of trustworthiness
based on their experiences with different groups of peo-
ple in localized settings such as the neighbourhood.
Similarly, Freitag and Traunmu¨ller (2009: p. 798) find
that trust in specific others such as family members can
represent a foundation for more generalized trusting ex-
pectations. However, both of these studies rely on cross-
sectional data. Glanville, Andersson and Paxton (2013)
find that positive changes in informal social ties enhance
trust, relying on two panel waves. Li, Pickles and Savage
(2005) investigate the British Household Panel Study
and find that embeddedness in informal networks and
neighbourhood attachment (not simple membership) are
related to higher generalized trust. Moreover, percep-
tions that one is treated fairly by political authorities
seem to matter for generalized trust (Kumlin and
Rothstein, 2010; Dinesen, 2012). Quantitative empirical
evidence regarding negative experiences is scarce.
Research based on the European Social Survey finds that
individuals who perceive that they belong to a discrimi-
nated group have lower levels of generalized trust
(Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010). Brehm and Rahn (1997:
p. 1016) rely on pooled cross-sectional data from the
General Social Survey and find that burglary victimiza-
tion undermines generalized trust. Other cross-sectional
analyses find effects of victimization experiences on gen-
eralized trust among young people in Finland and
Denmark (Salmi, Smolej and Kivivuori, 2007; Dinesen,
2012). Generally, cross-sectional data are strongly lim-
ited when it comes to causal inference. In addition, there
are different studies that investigate the effects of victim-
ization with in-depth interviews. Fischer (1984: p. 169)
interviews 50 victims and finds that victimization ex-
periences are similar to ‘post traumatic stress disorders’
with victims experiencing ‘distrust and suspiciousness’.
Averdijk (2010: p. 118f) interviews 41 victims and finds
that they report a general mistrust of people as a conse-
quence of their victimization, but often this mistrust is
focused on groups similar to the offenders. While inter-
viewing 24 mugging victims, Lejeune and Alex (1973)
find that assumptions of invulnerability and trust that
were present before the event were abandoned there-
after. Although these more qualitative studies lack con-
trol groups, they clearly point to the negative reactions
of victims. Altogether, arguments and empirical evi-
dence also give weight to a second research hypothesis:
Negative experiences do have a negative effect on gener-
alized trust (H1).
Design
We investigate two competing hypotheses, H0 (no effect)
and H1 (negative effect). Causality is generally investi-
gated departing from the counterfactual framework
(Rubin 1974; Holland, 1986), and we start by asking
what experiment we could ideally carry out to capture
the causal effect of interest (Angrist and Pischke, 2008:
p. 4). Ideally we would conduct a randomized field ex-
periment to maximize both internal as well as external
validity. We would draw a large random sample from
our target population (persons living in Switzerland)
and measure the level of trust of all sample members by
directly accessing their thoughts before and after the
treatment. We would recruit homogeneous offenders
that randomly treat half of the sample with exactly the
same negative factual experience (treatment group) and
leave the other half in peace (control group). Random
assignment of the treatment would allow for estimating
an unbiased (internally valid) causal effect, as it assures
that the treatment Di is unrelated to the potential out-
comes (Angrist and Pischke, 2008: p. 15). This ideal ex-
periment would have strong external validity, as the
sample is representative of a larger Swiss population and
the treatment is a real-life experience. Besides, we would
control the timing of both, outcome measurement and
treatment assignment. Clearly, this ideal experiment can
not be realized for ethical and practical reasons. Thus,
we have to resort to ‘natural’ variation of our treatment,
i.e. victimization across individuals. The described ideal
experiment, however, serves as the benchmark to which
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we can compare our research design to reveal potential
validity threats.
In what manner can we use observational data to
approximate our ideal experiment (Angrist and Pischke,
2008: p. 7)? In this study, we rely on a panel study de-
sign that differs from the ideal in several respects. First,
the treatment is not assigned randomly and there might
be selection bias. Victimization is not random. Rather,
different theories (cp. Wilcox, 2010) such as the life-
style-exposure theory (Hindelang, Gottfredson and
Garofalo, 1978) emphasize that attributes such as gen-
der or age are linked to different patterns of life that in-
crease the risk of being victimized (see also Gottfredson,
1984; Tseloni and Pease, 2004). These individual char-
acteristics are also likely to be related to our outcome
variable generalized trust in that there are differences in
trust levels between groups of, for instance, age or gen-
der (see e.g. Robinson and Jackson, 2001; Uslaner,
2002: pp. 155–156, 167f). Second, we have a random
sample of households rather than individuals and there
might be some inter-dependencies between household
members. Third, although we have repeated measures of
both outcome and treatment just as in the ideal experi-
ment, we do not control the timing of treatment and
outcome measurement. The treatment occurs sometime
between the yearly panel surveys and potentially the
causal effect depends on the timing. Also, we might not
have access to all sample members after the treatment
(panel attrition). Fourth, in contrast to the benchmark,
we do not observe/measure outcome and treatment dir-
ectly. We have to rely on self-reports by survey respond-
ents, and we have to think how far these self-reports
relate to factual reality. In our causal investigation, we
have to take all of these points into account.
We deal with the first problem, i.e. selection bias as
follows: when assuming parallel trends, that is, the trend
in generalized trust in the treatment group in absence
of the treatment is equal to the trend in generalized trust
in the control group, we can identify the average effect
of the treatment on the treated by using change scores as
outcome and estimating the parameters of the following
model (Allison, 1990; Morgan and Winship, 2007):
DYi ¼ Yit  Yit1 ¼ b0 þ b1 Di þ ei
where DYi is the change in the outcome between first
and second measurement, b0 is an intercept term,
namely, the average of the change in the untreated
group, and b1 is the causal effect, the amount added to
b0 when the treatment dummy Di jumps to one. Finally,
e is some error for which we assume normal distribution
and mean 0. This model assures that any stable unob-
servable confounder cancels itself out of the equation
(Wooldridge, 2010). In addition, we match victims and
nonvictims using different covariates to balance out
treatment and control group. While matching does not
have any advantages regarding selection bias, it has
some other advantages (see e.g. Legewie, 2012): After
the matching process, only those observations remain
that are comparable between treatment and control
group, i.e. observations characterized by common sup-
port with regard to the covariates (Morgan and
Winship, 2007: p. 117). Through this step we include
only observations that are ‘potentially exposable’ to the
treatment (Holland, 1986: p. 946). At the same time,
matching treatment and control group on various cova-
riates increases justification of the parallel trends as-
sumption, as both groups are more similar. Moreover,
matching procedures allow us to evaluate imbalance be-
tween treatment and control group and force us to think
clearly about potential selection processes. Thus, it
makes sense to add the matching step before estimating
the change score model. To deal with the other three
mentioned validity threats (household dependency,
treatment timing, i.e. intensity, and self-reports), we
carry out robustness checks that are reported in the em-
pirical section.
Data, Measures and Controls
The data come from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP)
study that follows a random sample of households in
Switzerland over time. It started in 1999 with 5,074
households/12,931 household members. In 2004, a
second sample of 2,538 households/6,569 household
members was added. Annual data collection is carried out
by means of computer-assisted telephone interviewing.
Using relatively reliable data from a single country is pref-
erable when it comes to causal inference, as several
factors that may vary across countries are held constant.
Table 1 gives an overview of panel waves that con-
tain measures of trust and victimization. Starting from
2002, the SHP contains the most widely used trust meas-
ure: ‘Would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people, if 0
means “Can’t be too careful” and 10 means “Most peo-
ple can be trusted”?’ This question has received some
criticism (Miller and Mitamura, 2003; Nannestad,
2008; Sturgis and Smith, 2010), but it is the only ques-
tion for which data are available across time both in na-
tional survey and in international surveys and has been
widely used in recent studies (e.g. Delhey, Newton and
Welzel, 2011; Sønderskov, 2011; Traunmu¨ller, 2011;
Dinesen, 2013; Mewes, 2014). Refraining from its use
would mean to discard data from numerous surveys
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such as the panel survey investigated here. Besides, this
question seems to function fairly well within the Swiss
context despite cultural and linguistic barriers and
strongly correlates with trust in strangers (Freitag and
Bauer, 2013). Also, there is further evidence that, espe-
cially in Switzerland, respondents associate this question
with outgroups (Delhey, Newton and Welzel, 2011).
We explicitly assume (as previous researchers have done
implicitly) that differences in question interpretation
across respondents are not linked to our treatment net
of covariates.
There are several questions querying negative experi-
ences from wave 2004 to 2008. Respondents were
asked: Have you been insulted or threatened verbally
since (month, year)? Have you been hit or injured since
(month, year)? Have you been sexually harassed or
forced to perform sexual acts since (month, year)?2
Therefore, we can draw on considerable amounts of
data for the treatments we are interested in. Figure 1
gives an overview of our data and of the whole sample
of respondents and shows how many respondents in the
respective year have been victimized. It illustrates that
the share of individuals suffering graver victimization
such as harassment is relatively low, which represents a
challenge in terms of estimation.
In general, we assume that selection on stable covari-
ates is the main problem regarding our causal relation-
ship. Certainly, there are attributes that might change
between t1 and t, but they represent a problem only if
they are systematically linked to victimization and gen-
eralized trust. For instance, one can hardly make a
strong argument for a directed impact of changes in civic
engagement (Ingen and Bekkers, 2015) or informal so-
cial ties (Glanville, Andersson and Paxton, 2013) (see
also Section 2) on the probability of being victimized.
Thus, we mainly control for the classic sociodemo-
graphic variables. We control for gender, age, education,
income, and minority status. All of these attributes tend
to be linked to certain life patterns and, thus, potentially
to victimization (Averdijk, 2010) and may also be linked
to generalized trust. Moreover, we control for un-
employment status, job loss since the last panel wave,
and active membership in organizations. Finally, repeat
victimization is increasingly discussed among criminolo-
gists (Polvi et al., 1991; Farrell, Phillips and Pease, 1995;
Averdijk, 2010). Just as some of the variables above,
repeat victimization can be seen as a proxy for other
factors. For instance, repeat victims are likely to live in
deprived contexts, which might also affect their levels of
generalized trust. Table A1 in the appendix presents
summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
Empirical Results
Owing to the vast amount of data and the resulting high
number of models we analyse (across panel waves and
treatments), we chose to display the results graphically.
Model summaries can be found in the Appendix.
Figure 2 (see Table A2) summarizes the estimates of 12
bivariate regression models, each estimating the naive
treatment effect for the respective year. The outcome
variable in M1-M12 is trust at time t. The victimization
experience has occurred sometime during the year be-
fore t, but is also queried at t. In other words, the effects
displayed are simply the differences between the trust
averages of those who reported an insult/threat, being
hit/injured, or being harassed and those who did not.
For all the victimization experiences, the naive estimate
of the causal effect is negative and substantially high,
considering that generalized trust is measured on an
11-point scale. Logically, uncertainty is higher for those
victimization experiences for which we have fewer data
points. Unfortunately, scarce data preclude any infer-
ence for victims of harassment. Although the point esti-
mate is negative, the 95% confidence intervals are larger
and cross 0. For this reason, we exclude the harassment
treatment in subsequent analyses. Clearly, these naive
estimates of the causal effect are likely biased in either
negative or positive direction because of selection.
Therefore, in a second step, we use the change score
DY ¼ Yit  Yit1 instead of Yit as the outcome variable.
Following H0, we would assume that the naive effect of
victimization on generalized trust is due to selection
rather than due to a direct effect of victimization on
Table 1. Trust and victimization questions across SHP waves
Panel wave 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Social trust (Y) n n n n n n n n n n n
Insulted or threatened (DThreat) n n n n n
Hit or injured (DInjury) n n n n n
Harassment (DHarassment) n n
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generalized trust. Hence, our second analysis should re-
sult in lower estimates of the treatment effect. H1, on
the other hand, holds that victimization experiences do
matter for generalized trust. Figure 3 displays the
estimates for the different panel waves (see Table A3).
We see that this design changes the picture substantially.
The effects of most of the victimization experiences
become weaker and ‘insignificant’ on usual levels.
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Figure 1. Full sample and absolute number of victims
Note: Graph displays total number of realized individual interviews in the respective years and the number of respondents who answered “yes” to three
different victimizations questions querying the occurrence of negative experiences in the previous year. Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP).
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Figure 2. Naive estimates for negative experiences on trust (Table 3)
Note: Symbols are point estimates for 12 bi-variate regression models (OLS); N¼Number observations of which T are victims and C are non-victims;
Bars are 95% confidence intervals. Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP).
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Although, we still find ‘significant’ effects for threats in
2004, 2005, and 2007 using this more rigorous strategy,
these are much smaller in substantial size than before.3
In general, these results illustrate how important it is to
investigate causal effects across panel data waves.
Results obtained for single panel waves may not hold
across waves. The presented effects correspond to the
difference in trust trends comparing the treatment group
with the full control group of untreated, that is, all re-
spondents who did not report to have been victimized at
that point in time.
In a third step, we balance treatment and control
groups using ‘genetic matching’ (Sekhon, 2011). We
match individuals on gender, age, education, member-
ship, income, victimization (in the previous year), un-
employment status, job loss within the respective panel
period, and minority status.4 The difference to M13-
M22 is that we now estimate effects using a control
group that is comparable regarding these matching vari-
ables. Results are displayed in Figure 4 and Table A4.
Balance statistics across panel data waves show that
there are strong differences between the unbalanced
treatment and control groups we used in step two.
Before the matching procedure, individuals in the con-
trol groups were generally older, better educated, and
had higher income. Besides, there were differences in
gender composition. After matching, these differences
are reduced massively and generally not significant
(see Table A5). The results seem to corroborate our find-
ings above. With few exceptions, the point estimates are
now close to zero and 95% confidence intervals mostly
cross the zero. In addition, we pooled the matched data
sets across years: the weighted averages of the estimates
are 0.04 for threat (SE¼ 0.06, N¼ 4,616) and 0.17
for injury (SE¼0.16, N¼692). Using this more rigor-
ous estimation strategy and design, we conclude that we
do not find a substantially strong causal effect that is
stable across panel data waves.
In a fourth step, we consider further threats to the
validity of our conclusions above as exposed by our
ideal experiment. First, we measure victimization
through self-reports at the end of each period. Factual
experiences of differing objective intensity could lurk
behind an individual’s ‘Yes’ (Measurement inequiva-
lence).5 Also, negative experiences might occur at differ-
ent points in time between the two panel waves (Timing
of the victimization experience). Assumably, effects of
victimization are immediate psychological effects, most
of which disappear after some months (Denkers and
Winkel, 1998). Respondents who answered that they
had been victim of a threat or insult between 2004 and
2008 were also asked, ‘Are you still affected by this [vic-
timization], if 0 means “not at all” and 10 “a great
deal?’. In this additional analysis, we solely focus on
threats.6 Potentially, individuals who score higher on
this scale do so because of one of the above mentioned
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Figure 3. Estimates for victimization on D trust (Table 4)
Note: Points are point estimates for 10 bi-variate regression models (OLS); N¼Number observations of which T are victims and C are non-victims; Bars
are 95% confidence intervals. Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP).
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reasons (stronger factual experience, recent timing of the
experience), in other words, a causal effect might only
be found for intense negative experiences. Accordingly,
we reestimated Models M 23, M 25, M 27, M 29, and
M 31 (change scoresþmatching), but now we com-
pare the nonvictims7 with those who were insulted/
threatened and score from 7 to 10 on the intensity
scale. Figure 5, Table A6, and Table A7 summarize the
results. We find that the effects are substantially weak
and insignificant across the five waves. Hence, there is
no strong counter evidence against our previous
conclusions.
Second, when comparing victims with nonvictims we
make the assumption that nonvictims are not influenced
by victims’ negative experiences. However, this assump-
tion may be violated when a nonvictim lives in the same
household as a victim. The victim’s negative experiences
might also affect the trust levels among other household
members. If these other household members are part of
our control group it biases our estimates. We checked
whether there are households with multiple victims.
This number is low and thus can be neglected in our
view.8 Thereafter, we reestimated Models 23–32 with a
modified data set that excludes nonvictimized individ-
uals that live together with a victim. The results do not
deviate significantly.9 Third, we account for the fact
that the causal effect might be heterogeneous for differ-
ent levels of our outcome variable. For instance,
individuals with extremely low levels of trust may re-
main unaffected, i.e. a trust starting value of 0 at t–1
cannot decrease. In general, individuals with extreme
values might be less affected by experiences. To test for
this possibility, we reestimate Models 23–32, using only
respondents with moderate trust levels (3–7) and subse-
quently only respondents with high trust levels (7–10).
All effects in the 20 models we reestimated (for threat
and injury) are of negligible substantial size. In other
words, our overall conclusions seem to hold in light of
these additional robustness checks.10
Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on
the relationship between experiences and generalized
trust. Using change score analysis combined with match-
ing, we find no causal effect that is substantially strong
and consistent across panel data waves. Our findings
support the notion that generalized trust as measured
with the standard survey question represents a rather
stable expectation that is only marginally influenced by
victimization experiences. This, somewhat contradicts
earlier findings for victimization or proxy variables of
positive experiences (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Li, Pickles
and Savage, 2005; Salmi, Smolej and Kivivuori 2007;
Glanville, Andersson and Paxton, 2013) and is more in
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line with results that find no effect of experiences
(Uslaner, 2002; Ingen and Bekkers, 2015).
Nonetheless, more studies are needed to corroborate
our findings, opening multiple avenues of further
research. First, our results need to be embedded in the
larger context of experience-trust research. Despite our
findings, it is still possible that negative experiences do
change victims’ specific expectations regarding the of-
fender and others that share his or her characteristics
(Averdijk, 2010). These more specific trust expectations
should matter when it comes to (non)cooperation with
these persons or groups. Applying the idea of trust ra-
dius (e.g. Delhey, Newton and Welzel, 2011), we would
probably find that victims’ trust levels remain un-
changed for the majority of people, however, trust in
persons or groups with offender characteristics de-
creases. As a consequence, they are excluded from a cer-
tain trust radius. To capture these more subtle facets, it
is necessary to collect data that include more informa-
tion on the attributes of the respective offenders and
subsequently also data on victims’ and nonvictims’ more
specific trust expectations regarding different trustees.
Generally, more specific trust measures would allow for
more sophisticated analyses of the experience–trust
nexus (Bauer, 2014). Second, in this study, we find al-
most no evidence for a direct causal effect of victimiza-
tion experiences. The strong selection bias shows that
other factors do matter, in particular, factors that affect
both individuals’ generalized trust and their probability
of victimization. Presumably individuals form their ex-
pectations from directly observing others’ behaviour and
apprehending others’ negative experiences. Hence, even
without direct victimization, contexts such as a deprived
dangerous neighbourhood should matter. In line with
this idea, there is evidence that fear of crime is related to
generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002: p. 109). More refined
longitudinal data on individuals’ observations of others’
untrustworthy behaviour and on experiences in their so-
cial networks and the contexts in which they live is ne-
cessary to test these arguments and enhance previous
contextual analyses (cp. Ross, Mirowsky and Pribesh,
2001; Marschall and Stolle, 2004; Traunmu¨ller, 2011).
Third, further systematic analyses beyond the single
case of Switzerland would be insightful. To our know-
ledge, the Swiss panel data set used in this study is the
only data set that contains appropriate measures and is
suited for causal inference. However, it is likely that the
impact of victimization on generalized trust depends on
the context. Swiss victims can rely on arrangements to
deal with the psychological consequences of their experi-
ence. Besides, Switzerland possesses a comparably effi-
cient system of justice that punishes offenders. In less
developed countries, these conditions might not apply
and victimization experiences may be more extreme on
average. These speculations need to be investigated em-
pirically. In general, a more thorough understanding of
the foundations of trust can only be attained if we are
successful in unraveling the complex relationship
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between trusting expectations, childhood experiences,
experiences in later life, and the contexts and social net-
works in which humans are embedded.
Notes
1 There is also a debate on the impact of genes
on trust (Oskarsson et al., 2012; Van Lange,
Vinkhuyzen and Posthuma 2014).
2 In wave 2002 and 2003, respondents were asked if
they had been attacked or threatened. This question
was dropped in 2004 because it confounds verbal
and physical victimization.
3 Uncertainty for the 2004 estimates is higher because
the sample of respondents in 2003, which we
needed to calculate the trust change score, was
smaller.
4 In additional models, we controlled for the cumula-
tive history of victimization i.e. the sum of victim-
izations in previous years. However, this did not
change the results (analyses available on request).
5 We had questions for different victimization experi-
ences, however, we could not find reliable evidence
that being hit or injured has a stronger effect than
e.g. an insult or threat (see Figure 2). The low num-
bers of respondents for the ‘more harsh’ victimiza-
tion experiences preclude any feasible conclusions
in this regard (even more so since social desirability
may decrease reports of the latter).
6 We assume that individuals who have been hit/
injured or harassed are contained in the group that
reports an insult or threat. Besides, we assume that
there is less underreporting for this question than
for the other two indicators, which is desirable.
7 Control groups are generated from individuals in
the same panel wave who did not experience an in-
sult or threat.
8 Across waves 2004–2008, the number of house-
holds that contain more than one victim never
exceeds 21 out of 1600 to 2005 households.
9 Results are available on request.
10 Another issue is the panel attrition: In general, the
SHP is ‘not particularly selective with respect to
important socio-demographic or -economic vari-
ables’ (Lipps, 2007: p. 63). Attrition might poten-
tially bias our estimates. If victims drop out
between two waves and they are special in that
they display higher negative changes in trust than
those victims who stay in the survey, we would
underestimate the causal effect. Unfortunately, we
cannot know whether respondents who dropped
out have been victims because they are not present
in the second wave when we ask for the victimiza-
tion experience. However, we carefully assume
that this is not the case or otherwise that the num-
bers of drop out victims with a stronger trend in
trust is so small that they do not matter.
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Appendix 1
Table A1. Summary statistics
Variable Number N Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum Range
Trust 2003 1 4,466 5.76 2.39 6 0 10 10
Trust 2004 2 8,035 5.66 2.45 6 0 10 10
Trust 2005 3 6,430 6.07 2.38 7 0 10 10
Trust 2006 4 6,383 6.15 2.29 7 0 10 10
Trust 2007 5 5,949 6.23 2.26 7 0 10 10
Trust 2008 6 5,793 6.26 2.27 7 0 10 10
Trust 2003–2004 7 3,922 0.27 2.25 0 10 10 20
Trust 2004–2005 8 5,942 0.29 2.21 0 10 10 20
Trust 2005–2006 9 5,403 0.06 2.06 0 10 10 20
Trust 2006–2007 10 5,321 0.01 1.97 0 10 10 20
Trust 2007–2008 11 5,149 0.02 1.94 0 10 10 20
Threat 2004 12 8,115 0.10 0.29 0 0 1 1
Threat 2005 13 6,461 0.09 0.28 0 0 1 1
Threat 2006 14 6,407 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 1
Threat 2007 15 5,970 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 1
Threat 2008 16 5,817 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2004 17 7,471 0.02 0.13 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2005 18 5,980 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2006 19 5,880 0.02 0.12 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2007 20 5,472 0.01 0.11 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2008 21 5,300 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Injury 2004 22 8,115 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Injury 2005 23 6,462 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Injury 2006 24 6,412 0.02 0.12 0 0 1 1
Injury 2007 25 5,973 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Injury 2008 26 5,822 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Harassment 2004 27 8,114 0.01 0.07 0 0 1 1
Harassment 2005 28 6,462 0.01 0.07 0 0 1 1
29 12,248 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 1
Agea 30 12,248 42.17 18.80 42 11 95 84
Education 2003 31 5,913 4.45 3.05 4 0 10 10
Education 2004 32 12,094 4.48 3.03 4 0 10 10
Education 2005 33 9,342 4.62 3.05 4 0 10 10
Education 2006 34 8,619 4.70 3.06 4 0 10 10
Education 2007 35 7,719 4.83 3.06 4 0 10 10
Member 2003 36 12,248 0.21 0.40 0 0 1 1
Member 2004 37 12,248 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 1
Member 2005 38 12,248 0.29 0.46 0 0 1 1
Member 2006 39 12,248 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 1
Member 2007 40 12,248 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 1
Income 2003 41 2,934 1.43 1.13 1 0 3 3
Income 2004 42 5,188 1.41 1.13 1 0 3 3
Income 2005 43 4,297 1.42 1.14 1 0 3 3
Income 2006 44 4,225 1.41 1.15 1 0 3 3
Income 2007 45 4,007 1.41 1.17 1 0 3 3
Victim 2003 46 12,248 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Victim 2004 47 12,248 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 1
Victim 2005 48 12,248 0.05 0.22 0 0 1 1
(continued)
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Table A1. Continued
Variable Number N Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum Range
Victim 2006 49 12,248 0.05 0.22 0 0 1 1
Victim 2007 50 12,248 0.05 0.21 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2003 51 4,478 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2004 52 8,109 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2005 53 6,461 0.02 0.13 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2006 54 6,408 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2007 55 5,973 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Job loss 2003–2004 56 3,945 0.01 0.09 0 0 1 1
Job loss 2004–2005 57 5,999 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Job loss 2005–2006 58 5,439 0.01 0.09 0 0 1 1
Job loss 2006–2007 59 5,360 0.01 0.07 0 0 1 1
Job loss 2007–2008 60 5,183 0.01 0.08 0 0 1 1
Minority 2003 61 6,018 0.01 0.09 0 0 1 1
Minority 2004 62 12,234 0.01 0.11 0 0 1 1
Minority 2005 63 9,405 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Minority 2006 64 8,658 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Minority 2007 65 7,731 0.01 0.09 0 0 1 1
Note: aAge and gender variables taken from 2004 wave that includes the 1999 sample and the additional 2004 sample from the SHP.
Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP).
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Table A5. Balance statistics for Model 23–Model 32 (Figure 4)
Model: outcome/treatment Variable Mean
difference
before
P value
before
Mean
difference
after
P value
after
Orig. N Orig.
treated N
N matched
observation
M 23: Trust 2003–2004 Male 0.09 0.02 0.00 1.00 2,558 209 379
Threat 2004 Age 3.44 0.00 0.17 0.42 2,558 209 379
Education 2003 0.15 0.47 0.04 0.48 2,558 209 379
Member 2003 0.01 0.71 0.00 1.00 2,558 209 379
Income 2003 0.05 0.50 0.02 0.45 2,558 209 379
Victim 2003 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 2,558 209 379
Unemployed 2003 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.32 2,558 209 379
Job loss 2003–2004 0.01 0.36 0.00 1.00 2,558 209 379
Minority 2003 0.01 0.44 0.00 1.00 2,558 209 379
M 24: Trust 2003–2004 Male 0.15 0.16 0.00 1.00 2,558 22 45
Injury 2004 Age 10.64 0.00 0.21 0.74 2,558 22 45
Education 2003 0.75 0.29 0.02 0.73 2,558 22 45
Member 2003 0.05 0.64 0.00 1.00 2,558 22 45
Income 2003 0.22 0.39 0.00 1.00 2,558 22 45
Victim 2003 0.21 0.04 0.00 1.00 2,558 22 45
Unemployed 2003 0.03 0.52 0.00 1.00 2,558 22 45
Job loss 2003–2004 0.03 0.45 0.00 1.00 2,558 22 45
Minority 2003 0.04 0.38 0.00 1.00 2,558 22 45
M 25: Trust 2004–2005 Male 0.06 0.04 0.00 1.00 3,867 337 604
Threat 2005 Age 4.24 0.00 0.12 0.40 3,867 337 604
Education 2004 0.27 0.12 0.04 0.45 3,867 337 604
Member 2004 0.03 0.27 0.00 1.00 3,867 337 604
Income 2004 0.06 0.38 0.01 0.53 3,867 337 604
Victim 2004 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,867 337 604
Unemployed 2004 0.00 0.97 0.00 1.00 3,867 337 604
Job loss 2004–2005 0.01 0.24 0.00 1.00 3,867 337 604
Minority 2004 0.00 0.69 0.00 1.00 3,867 337 604
M 26: Trust 2004–2005 Male 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,866 41 87
Injury 2005 Age 14.11 0.00 0.11 0.64 3,866 41 87
Education 2004 1.94 0.00 0.02 0.88 3,866 41 87
Member 2004 0.12 0.13 0.00 1.00 3,866 41 87
Income 2004 0.47 0.01 0.05 0.53 3,866 41 87
Victim 2004 0.58 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,866 41 87
Unemployed 2004 0.01 0.60 0.00 1.00 3,866 41 87
Job loss 2004–2005 0.01 0.62 0.00 1.00 3,866 41 87
Minority 2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,866 41 87
M 27: Trust 2005–2006 Male 0.08 0.01 0 1.00 3,601 365 679
Threat 2006 Age 5.09 0.00 0 0.99 3,601 365 679
Education 2005 0.47 0.01 0 1.00 3,601 365 679
Member 2005 0.00 0.98 0 1.00 3,601 365 679
Income 2005 0.15 0.02 0 1.00 3,,601 365 679
Victim 2005 0.33 0.00 0 1.00 3,601 365 679
Unemployed 2005 0.01 0.32 0 1.00 3,601 365 679
Job loss 2005–2006 0.00 0.65 0 1.00 3,601 365 679
Minority 2005 0.01 0.00 0 1.00 3,601 365 679
M 28: Trust 2005–2006 Male 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,604 46 118
Injury 2006 Age 16.22 0.00 0.05 0.86 3,604 46 118
Education 2005 2.23 0.00 0.02 0.86 3,604 46 118
Member 2005 0.10 0.20 0.00 1.00 3,604 46 118
(continued)
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Table A5. Continued
Model: outcome/treatment Variable Mean
difference
before
P value
before
Mean
difference
after
P value
after
Orig. N Orig.
treated N
N matched
observation
Income 2005 0.64 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,604 46 118
Victim 2005 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,604 46 118
Unemployed 2005 0.03 0.31 0.00 1.00 3,604 46 118
Job loss 2005–2006 0.01 0.60 0.00 1.00 3,604 46 118
Minority 2005 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,604 46 118
M 29: Trust 2006–2007 Male 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.86 3,502 342 641
Threat 2007 Age 6.63 0.00 0.02 0.78 3,502 342 641
Education 2006 0.68 0.00 0.01 0.76 3,502 342 641
Member 2006 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.00 3,502 342 641
Income 2006 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.86 3,502 342 641
Victim 2006 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,502 342 641
Unemployed 2006 0.01 0.32 0.00 1.00 3,502 342 641
Job loss 2006–2007 0.00 0.86 0.00 1.00 3,502 342 641
Minority 2006 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 3,502 342 641
M 30: Trust 2006–2007 Male 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,504 49 115
Injury 2007 Age 13.92 0.00 0.06 0.90 3,504 49 115
Education 2006 1.99 0.00 0.04 0.53 3,504 49 115
Member 2006 0.09 0.18 0.00 1.00 3,504 49 115
Income 2006 0.65 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,504 49 115
Victim 2006 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,504 49 115
Unemployed 2006 0.01 0.74 0.00 1.00 3,504 49 115
Job loss 2006–2007 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,504 49 115
Minority 2006 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,504 49 115
M 31: Trust 2007–2008 Male 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,480 372 688
Threat 2008 Age 7.70 0.00 0.01 0.98 3,480 372 688
Education 2007 0.81 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,480 372 688
Member 2007 0.01 0.75 0.00 1.00 3,480 372 688
Income 2007 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,480 372 688
Victim 2007 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,480 372 688
Unemployed 2007 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 3,480 372 688
Job loss 2007–2008 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.00 3,480 372 688
Minority 2007 0.00 0.73 0.00 1.00 3,480 372 688
M 32: Trust 2007–2008 Male 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,482 54 115
Injury 2008 Age 9.79 0.00 0.08 0.62 3,482 54 115
Education 2007 1.14 0.01 0.04 0.64 3,482 54 115
Member 2007 0.04 0.54 0.00 1.00 3,482 54 115
Income 2007 0.23 0.18 0.02 0.71 3,482 54 115
Victim 2007 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,482 54 115
Unemployed 2007 0.03 0.30 0.00 1.00 3,482 54 115
Job loss 2007–2008 0.01 0.53 0.00 1.00 3,482 54 115
Minority 2007 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,482 54 115
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Table A6. Estimates for victimization of high intensity on D trust after matching on gender, age, education, membership,
incomes, victimization (previous year), unemployment status, job loss, and minority status (Figure 5)
Dependent variable
D Trust 2003–2004 D Trust 2004–2005 D Trust 2005–2006 D Trust 2006–2007 D Trust 2007–2008
(33) (34) (35) (36) (37)
Intense threat 2004 –0.19 (0.55)
Intense threat 2005 –0.49 (0.44)
Intense threat 2006 –0.46 (0.42)
Intense threat 2007 –0.39 (0.43)
Intense threat 2008 –0.14 (0.46)
Malea –1.42* (0.75) 0.63 (0.55) 0.69 (0.55) –0.50 (0.47) –1.45* (0.82)
Agea 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) –0.01 (0.02) –0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Educationb –0.17 (0.14) –0.02 (0.09) –0.05 (0.10) 0.12 (0.09) 0.04 (0.13)
Memberb 1.12 (0.69) –0.28 (0.47) –0.54 (0.44) –0.47 (0.48) 0.66 (0.81)
Incomeb 0.50 (0.40) –0.54** (0.27) –0.29 (0.54) –0.04 (0.23) 0.40 (0.38)
Victimb 0.35 (1.38) –0.21 (0.51) 0.83 (0.54) –0.51 (0.46) –0.21 (0.57)
Unemployedb 1.46 (1.80) –0.36 (1.62) 0.21 (0.88) –0.98 (1.48)
Job lossc 0.04 (1.04) 1.23 (1.53) –0.85 (1.27)
Minorityb –0.51 (1.44) 0.40 (1.30)
Constant –0.10 (1.59) 1.37 (1.24) 1.32 (1.04) 0.21 (0.73) –0.95 (1.26)
Observations 77 104 106 145 90
R2 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.07
Adjusted R2 –0.01 –0.02 0.03 0.01 –0.03
Note: aAge and gender measured in 2004.
bMeasured at t-1.
cJob loss between t1 and t; Standard errors in parentheses; One-to-one genetic matching with replacement with population size 500 for genoud and 1,000 boot-
strap samples to generate balance statistics using ‘Matching’ package for R (Version 4.8-3.4) (Sekhon, 2011).
*P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01.
Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP).
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Table A7. Balance statistics for Model 33–Model 37 (Figure 5)
Model: outcome/treatment Variable Mean
difference
before
P value
before
Mean
difference
after
P value
after
Orig.
N
Orig.
treated N
Nmatched
obs.
M 33: Trust 2003–2004 Male 0.18 0.05 0.00 1.00 2,379 30 47
Intense threat 2004 Age 0.55 0.80 0.10 0.83 2,379 30 47
Education 2003 0.06 0.91 0.03 0.82 2,379 30 47
Member 2003 0.15 0.11 0.00 1.00 2,379 30 47
Income 2003 0.08 0.68 0.00 1.00 2,379 30 47
Victim 2003 0.05 0.27 0.00 1.00 2,379 30 47
Unemployed 2003 0.02 0.59 0.00 1.00 2,379 30 47
Job loss 2003–2004 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 2,379 30 47
Minority 2003 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.32 2,379 30 47
M 34: Trust 2004–2005 Male 0.14 0.06 0.00 1.00 3,574 44 60
Intense threat 2005 Age 1.55 0.33 0.02 0.97 3,574 44 60
Education 2004 0.29 0.52 0.00 1.00 3,574 44 60
Member 2004 0.04 0.65 0.02 0.81 3,574 44 60
Income 2004 0.17 0.31 0.02 0.80 3,574 44 60
Victim 2004 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,574 44 60
Unemployed 2004 0.01 0.63 0.00 1.00 3,574 44 60
Job loss 2004–2005 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.00 3,574 44 60
Minority 2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,574 44 60
M 35: Trust 2005–2006 Male 0.17 0.02 0.00 1.00 3,279 43 63
Intense threat 2006 Age 1.68 0.39 0.12 0.71 3,279 43 63
Education 2005 0.27 0.49 0.09 0.73 3,279 43 63
Member 2005 0.04 0.62 0.00 1.00 3,279 43 63
Income 2005 0.17 0.31 0.00 1.00 3,279 43 63
Victim 2005 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,279 43 63
Unemployed 2005 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.00 3,279 43 63
Job loss 2005–2006 0.01 0.59 0.00 1.00 3,279 43 63
Minority 2005 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,279 43 63
M 36: Trust 2006–2007 Male 0.01 0.86 0.00 1.00 3,199 39 106
Intense threat 2007 Age 4.72 0.07 0.19 0.88 3,199 39 106
Education 2006 0.40 0.45 0.03 0.75 3,199 39 106
Member 2006 0.07 0.42 0.00 1.00 3,199 39 106
Income 2006 0.41 0.03 0.00 1.00 3,199 39 106
Victim 2006 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,199 39 106
Unemployed 2006 0.01 0.62 0.00 1.00 3,199 39 106
Job loss 2006–2007 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,199 39 106
Minority 2006 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,199 39 106
M 37: Trust 2007–2008 Male 0.19 0.04 0.00 1.00 3,136 28 62
Intense threat 2008 Age 2.18 0.41 0.02 0.95 3,136 28 62
Education 2007 1.13 0.05 0.03 0.84 3,136 28 62
Member 2007 0.27 0.01 0.00 1.00 3,136 28 62
Income 2007 0.31 0.13 0.00 1.00 3,136 28 62
Victim 2007 0.26 0.01 0.00 1.00 3,136 28 62
Unemployed 2007 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3,136 28 62
Job loss 2007–2008 0.03 0.40 0.00 1.00 3,136 28 62
Minority 2007 0.03 0.42 0.00 1.00 3,136 28 62
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